Spotlight September 19, 2002 |
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The main problem with consensus Wall Street earnings estimates is that they are based upon ‘operational results’. Such earnings results ignore pesky ‘1-time’ charges that corporate executives regularly delegate to the footnotes in 10Qs mailed to the SEC well after reporting season has passed by.
The precursor comment to calling analyst estimates insane is that many of the Dow 30 companies have a global reach. Thus, if another alternative engine of growth were to emerge, unlikely as that may seem, higher levels of earnings growth could be attained. However, with global stock markets, not just American exchanges, floundering and no economy close to comparable with the American, such a transition phase can hardly be assured and/or forecasted to occur during the next 5-years. All may not be lost. After all, as the actual reporting season draws near and analysts trim their expectations the gap narrows. In fact, First Call’s Chuck Hill states that 2Q02 ‘was one of the rare occasions of late when the final results essentially matched analyst expectations at the beginning of the quarter.’ Nevertheless, it is the longer-term analyst expectations that appear to be completely erroneous time and time again. This was the case when the bull market began (1983-1985) when analyst (Value Line) estimates were more than double the actual results, and this was also the case in 2Q02. To be sure, while Mr. Hill applauds the fact that analyst estimates for 2Q02 were at +1.6% when the quarter began and actual results came in at +1.4%, what he neglects to mention is that estimates in 2Q01 for 2Q02 stood at nearly +30%. Moreover, even as 2002 began analysts still suspected a nearly 9% improvement in 2Q02 results. Point being, analysts may expect Dow companies to average 11.4% earnings growth over the next 5-years – and this is undoubtedly why many investment models portend that stocks are undervalued. But as time goes on ‘normal trimming’ will take place, the expectation for future growth will be pushed back further and further, and further…. The Dow is trading at 23 times trailing operational results. Before the bull market began in 1982 only 6 Dow components traded with double digit P/Es and the overall average (1980) was below 8. In sum, ridiculous long-term growth estimates, even though they have been proven wrong time and time again, are one of the only reasons why near record highs in trailing P/Es are possible. Things are always improving – better times lie ahead – the worst is truly over. * Whereas ‘operational results’ for the S&P 500 have grown on average by 4.1% over the last 5-years, ‘as reported’ results have grown by only 1.8%. Furthermore, adjusted corporate profit data from the BEA (chart) shows that corporate earning (total) have actually declined on average by 0.4% over the last 5-years. |
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